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BRIEFING BOOK

Dr. Kissinger's Visit to the PRC

June 1972

Opening Statement

Soviet Union ✓

Japan ✓

Indochina ✓

Korea

South Asia ✓

Taiwan ✓

United Nations

American POWs

Trade and Exchanges

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6/18

Dr. Kissinger's Opening Statement

Introduction

Mr. Prime Minister:

-- President and Mrs. Nixon send their warm personal regards to you and all the Chinese who made their visit such a rich, memorable experience. The President asked me to convey his special greetings to Chairman Mao and yourself.

-- It is a great personal pleasure for me to return to the People's Republic of China and to see many people whom I now consider old friends.

-- I have done a great deal of traveling during the last year and have been treated everywhere with great courtesy. But I have a special feeling about China -- the graciousness of your hospitality and the seriousness of your purposes.

Basic Themes

-- I look forward to my discussions with you and other Chinese leaders. This visit comes at a particularly opportune time.

-- The announcement of my trip said that our discussions are designed "to further the normalization of relations" between our two countries and "continue to exchange views on issues of common interest." The President has instructed me to hold full and frank talks in both these

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areas: our purpose is to further the development of our bilateral relations and candidly to set forth our views on the international context of our relationship.

-- More specifically, I would like to stress these general themes in these opening remarks.

-- We have come together during the past couple of years because of historical forces and mutual need. After a long period of isolation and suspicion, the leaders of the PRC and US both had the wisdom to see the requirement for, and the opportunities in, forging the renewal of ties between our countries. History may record it as the most important event of the Administration of President Nixon.

-- The decision to revive a relationship that history had set aside for two decades was a portentous one for both of us.

-- Under President Nixon, the United States set out to forge a new foreign policy that would reflect the changed conditions in the world. The post World War II era was ending and a new constellation of forces was shaping the international environment. Our friends were stronger and more self-reliant. Our potential adversaries clearly did not speak with one voice.

-- In this transformed context we believed it essential to communicate with the People's Republic of China. *it be a central feature* There were misunderstandings to

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be avoided; tensions to be reduced; and perhaps over the long run, mutual tasks to perform.

-- We, in turn, recognize the basic motives that led the People's Republic to its new policy. I remember the moving accounts of the Prime Minister which described the dangers facing your country. The President and I have pointed out that the United States ^{is} ~~was~~ not one of them.

-- Some of the trends the Prime Minister traced have continued. They are not the result of collusion on our part. They are partly due to the fact that others are ^{intention} willing to move at a faster pace than the PRC. It is in the PRC's capabilities to contain some of these trends and ^{capability} deflect some of the pressures upon it.

-- We believe that a strong and viable China is in our own national interest. This is not due to any altruism or approval of your system, but rather our view that such a China would be a stabilizing influence in Asia and in the world.

-- Similarly, given global realities, we think that it is in the PRC's interest that the United States continue to play a responsible world role. A weak or indecisive United States would complicate, not ease, your difficulties.

-- So our new links are today based on a mutual need and mutual recognition that we do not threaten each other's interest. We believe that in time we can move from this situation to one where China and the United States can think more positively of each other as countries with parallel objectives in many respects.

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-- In recent months there have been moments of uneasiness in our relationship. But, on the whole we have made a good beginning.

-- We not only reestablished contact after twenty-three years. We have sought to make that contact last and grow by shaping a climate of trust and reliability in our dealings with each other. In our conceptions we have recognized each other's problems. And in our actions we have implemented our undertakings.

-- We have made progress, in short, for two principal reasons:

- (1) Despite differences of principle and policy, we -- especially the Prime Minister -- had the wisdom to decide what could be settled now and what should be left to history, while indicating the general direction.
- (2) Despite differences of ideology, we have dealt with each other honorably and morally. Both sides have kept their commitments scrupulously.

-- We made a series of commitments and understandings to you which we have carried out as precisely as we could. Some examples:

- . Our public and private positions on Taiwan have reflected the pledges the President reaffirmed to you in February.
- . In our dealings with the Soviet Union, we have kept you carefully informed; have ensured that agreements with Moscow would not affect or embarrass you; have remained prepared to conclude similar agreements with you; and have refused to

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discuss the PRC with the Soviet Union.

- . We have attempted to discourage trends in Japan that might cause concern to the PRC.
- . We have kept Peking fully abreast of our South Asian moves and have continued our efforts to support Pakistan.
- . The most fundamental expression of our attitude and our undertaking came last December during the South Asian crisis. The political risks that the President took in acting decisively against Moscow and New Delhi are well known. Even more crucial, I know personally that the President risked nuclear confrontation in carrying out a policy that in part was designed to deflect pressures directed against the PRC.

/ NOTE: The full list of our undertakings to the PRC and our fulfillment is attached at end of opening statement, at Tab A. /

-- You in turn have been faithful in your own undertakings toward us. For example, you have treated the sensitive Taiwan issue with great delicacy and tact. You have been meticulous in your confidentiality, in our private dealings, and in our joint announcements. You have shown general restraint in your public statements on Indochina and other subjects, at least until recently.

-- You have also been careful, until recent days, not to impinge on our domestic political scene. This is a subject that bears some discussion

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now, however, in connection with Indochina. For I'm sure we both recognize that any inference -- however subtle -- of interfering in domestic politics of the other country is totally unacceptable.

-- Thus the climate of our bilateral relationship is crucial. After so many years of non-communication some lingering mistrust is inevitable. For our part we shall do our best to erase the remnants of the past and to develop mutual confidence through our words and deeds.

-- The substance, as well as the climate, of our dealings is important. In the four months that have passed since the President's visit and the issuance of the ^{LA}Shanghai Communique, we have made some concrete progress in our bilateral interchange:

- . Through various means we have exchanged views on major issues; we view the development of this dialogue in itself as an important aspect of "normalizing" relations.
- . There has been some movement in the area of exchanges such as your table tennis team's tour and Congressional visits here.
- . And there ~~has~~ been modest efforts in the trade area with the visit of our businessmen to the Canton Fair.

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-- Taiwan was clearly the most potentially difficult obstacle in our bilateral dealings. It is precisely on this issue that both sides have shown their willingness to take into account each other's problems and to see to it that the issue did not stand in the way of developing relations.

-- The PRC has, throughout the past year, shown the wisdom of letting history take its course within a mutually agreed framework.

-- We appreciate the sensitivity with which the Prime Minister has handled this issue with Americans.

-- We in turn have -- and will -- adhere to the principles the President reaffirmed to you:

- . (1) *There is one China message + not official*
modification future There is one China and Taiwan is part of it.
- . (2) We will not support any Taiwan Independence Movement;
- . (3) We will discourage Japan from moving into Taiwan or supporting Taiwanese independence;
- . (4) We will support any peaceful resolution of the issue;
- . (5) We seek normalization of US-PRC relations.

-- We have stressed these points in Japan, for example.

-- We still plan -- as the President pledged -- to remove from Taiwan the two-thirds of our forces related to Southeast Asia as the conflict is brought to a close.

-- Reduction of the remainder will go forward as progress is

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made on the peaceful resolution of the Taiwan problem.

-- I am prepared to discuss this question which we recognize is of cardinal importance to the PRC.

International Issues

-- There have been major developments in various areas of the world since February that merit our frank discussion. Following are some of the topics that we will want to cover.

-- Soviet Union. I am prepared to give you a full rundown of the President's trip to the USSR, the various bilateral agreements we raised, and our discussions of international questions.

-- As we said we would do, we have kept you fully informed about our dealings with the Soviet Union. You have already received an interim report on the May Summit.

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-- There were essentially three types of agreements concluded in Moscow:

. (1) Those - like environment, space and science - which reflect the fact that we are two advanced industrial countries with common problems and knowledge to share. We are ready to discuss these problems with you as well.

. (2) The SALT agreements which are of unique concern to the two major nuclear powers. We were careful to keep out all implications affecting you or other third countries. For example, we rejected attempts to have agreement on preventing accidental war be directed at third countries.

. (3) Basic principles of US-USSR bilateral relations. These principles are somewhat similar to what we agreed with you in the Shanghai Communique. We made sure that these principles and the joint communique were confined to the U.S. and USSR and did not lecture other countries on their responsibilities. Thus we did not accept a Soviet suggestion that we appeal to all nuclear countries, or members of the Security Council, to pursue certain policies.

-- There was also the establishment of a joint economic commission to sort out various, linked problems of trade and other economic issues.

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-- I can go into any of these areas with whatever detail you wish.

-- I also think we might wish to talk about the broader Soviet strategy and motivations.

-- Europe. For example, the USSR has exhibited great energy in pursuing detente on its western flank in Europe.

-- Thus there have been the Berlin Agreement and the German treaties with the USSR and Poland. And discussions will soon be launched on a European Security Conference and force reductions in Europe.

-- We recognize that a detente in Europe means greater potential pressure on the PRC. And we recognize that this may be a prime Soviet motivation. A more secure western front and troop reductions would release forces for their eastern front.

-- That, of course, is not our intention in seeking agreements in Europe. But it is objective reality.

-- Frankly, there is no way for us to avoid this dilemma. The option of keeping pressure on the USSR in Europe is not open to us.

-- But as we have said before, we will not support -- indeed we will oppose -- pressure on you. We are prepared to compensate for whatever freedom of movement is given to the Soviets as a result of European moves by staking our position to the unimpaired independence of the People's Republic.

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-- Asia. There also are Soviet moves in the Far East that are designed further to encircle you:

- . Their overtures to Japan.
- . Their backing of India in the subcontinent.
- . Their increasing naval presence in the Indian Ocean.
- . Their willingness to see Hanoi dominate Indochina,
fueled by Soviet arms.

-- The PRC, of course, is able to defend itself against this strategy. It can be sure that we will never knowingly contribute to it.

-- As you know, I have just returned from a three day trip to Japan where I had intensive talks with a broad cross-section of political

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-- I would be very much interested in exchanging views with you on the Japanese. The Chinese have had much more intimate ties with them through history and understand them better.

-- I also told the Japanese what I have told you - that we think the U.S. -Japan Mutual Security Treaty remains the best guarantee that Japan will not expand her own military activities.

-- Other Areas. There are a number of other international issues on which we can profitably exchange views.

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to give it the maximum amount of economic and political support, though our Congressional situation restricts our ability to give military aid. I look forward to hearing your views on this area.

-- Part of the wisdom of our relationship to date has been our willingness to distinguish between what needs to be done immediately and what can be left to history. It is this perspective that is needed in Korea, for example, where there has been increasing communication between North and South. We favor these developing contacts. Dialogue between the Koreans themselves is the soundest way to remove that peninsula as a potential flashpoint in the Far East. We believe that outside powers can best contribute by letting the Koreans work their own destiny and showing restraint in actions and public rhetoric.

Development of US-PRC Ties

-- In short, Mr. Prime Minister, our joint announcement last July has -- as you predicted -- "shaken the world." There is great fluidity on the international scene -- and many of the participants must now key their actions to their perceptions of the Sino-American relationship.

-- We consider it in our national interest to demonstrate that this relationship will grow.

-- We believe as well that the pressures on the PRC of detente in Europe and encirclement in Asia can be eased by more direct and broader relations with the United States.

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-- Thus we are prepared to discuss concrete ways in which we can develop our relations, putting into practice the various areas indicated by the Shanghai Communiqué. Whether to make progress in these various bilateral areas is essentially a political decision. For our part, the U.S. has made this decision to move ahead.

-- As we explained in October and February, we do not exaggerate the specific importance of some of these bilateral areas and we do not look on their expansion as a great favor for us. For example, our projected trade with you, under the best circumstances, will not be significant at all in our overall economic picture.

-- Instead, we see development in these areas as being important primarily as visible manifestations of progress in our relationship. They signify that both of us have an increasing stake in that relationship. This is essential as a symbol for enabling us to resist pressures that may result from world developments.

-- Thus, the U.S. is ready to step up the tempo in these various fields and move ahead in the normalization of our relations. It is clear that it is difficult to move quickly on some of these matters in the Paris channel and that we could provide useful momentum here.

-- In general we believe we should lend some impetus here which could then be followed up by our Ambassadors in Paris or by other bodies we might set up. Leaving the initiative to the formal channel means delay and bureaucratic interference.

-- I am prepared to talk concretely about ways to move ahead. We have looked at fields where the US and PRC could more usefully work

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concluded in Moscow during the President's trip. We are willing to discuss any of these areas which interest you.

-- Among the areas where we think it would be mutually profitable to step up our contacts are the following:

- . Exchange programs, where we need to put on a more systematic footing the many suggestions and proposals that have flooded both sides.
- . Commercial relations, where the first tentative steps have been taken.
- . Health and medicine, where frankly we have much to learn from you as well as to contribute.
- . Science and technology, where we can search together for ways to advance the well-being of our peoples.
- . Agriculture, where you have made great strides and we think we have some knowledge that could assist you.

-- Our tentative conclusion is that in many fields the most useful step at this stage would be to establish joint US-PRC commissions to sort out various proposals and problems. This approach might prove more effective than dealing piecemeal with individual projects.

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Indochina

-- The one issue that still threatens to plague our bilateral relations is Indochina. It is a problem that will pass in the not too distant future. But together we face the challenge in the meantime of not letting it intrude upon our still fragile relationship.

-- Here is precisely an area where we must differentiate between short term considerations and long term realities.

-- As we have said before, we know your formal positions and why you must take them. The art of wisdom, however, is to go beyond formal positions to reality.

-- Any rational strategic assessment shows that it is not the U.S. which poses a longer term threat to either North Vietnam or the PRC. We are withdrawing our forces and giving up our bases. We have made it clear that we will take out all of our forces from Indochina, leaving no residual "tail," if there is a ceasefire and return of our prisoners. We can have no desire to maintain the Dulles policy in this corner of Asia when we are radically changing it elsewhere.

-- We are not asking PRC support in the actual negotiations. We do ask your understanding both of our limited aims, and of the reasons we cannot do what the North Vietnamese have insisted.

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-- We respect that they are men of principle, but so are we.

We are being asked to do something that as men of principle we cannot accept. Had you made a similar demand on us last summer, the process of normalization would never have started.

-- The North Vietnamese have absolutely refused to make the distinction between what can be done immediately and what must be left to historical processes.

-- You have understood that the Dulles period has ended. They still fight its battles. And they seek to achieve their aims by undermining our domestic situation.

-- Such tactics will not work. No pressures will deflect us from the course we have set. The President retains sufficient domestic support for his policies. The opposition is irreconcilable. Their views are indistinguishable from Hanoi's and we cannot appease them. So we will ignore them.

-- Senator McGovern has all the votes he's going to get on this issue. The latest independent polls in the United States give President Nixon a 20% lead over Senator McGovern. Historically it has proven impossible to close such a gap.

-- In any event, the President is concerned about the best policy, not the best way to get reelected. And in fact, given the essential fibre

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of the American people, our judgment is that they would reject an unprincipled American policy, whatever their weariness with the war.

-- Thus Hanoi, or any one else, who seeks to influence our domestic politics is indulging in wishful thinking. The line-up in our country is essentially fixed.

-- The issues involved here far transcend Vietnam. In this regard, the PRC must ask itself whether it is in its own interests to discourage supporters of the present Administration or encourage its opponents. Those who oppose the President may espouse causes that have superficial appeal. They may talk a good game.

-- But they can be expected to pursue their traditional policies if they gain power. Their impulses are pro-Soviet, pro-India, pro-Japan, and their focus is apt to be more on Europe than on Asia. The objective consequences could be the isolation of the PRC.

-- And whatever their policies, they would lack both the will -- and the wherewithal -- to act decisively in a crisis.

-- In any event I'm sure we both recognize that interference in each other's domestic scene is totally unacceptable.

-- Thus the PRC must weigh short-term considerations against longer-range perspectives. On other issues in our relations it has wisely opted for the latter.

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-- In this regard we recognize that we have the obligation to try not to embarrass you or involve you directly. We clearly have every interest in avoiding that type of situation.

-- Accordingly, our military actions are solely directed at Hanoi. We can have no reason to implicate third countries. Thus we regret certain border and other incidents that you have brought to our attention. We have looked into them and taken corrective measures.

-- As we told you - and should be apparent by now - we have taken stringent measures and instituted new procedures to prevent reoccurrences of these incidents. And we plan to discipline any personnel responsible for intrusions. You probably have noticed that in the case of other unauthorized air activities we have removed and demoted a four star general.

-- The President has asked me to reaffirm that our primary objective in Indochina is to end the war through a negotiated settlement. If Hanoi ever chooses to talk seriously, it will find us reasonable. It must negotiate genuinely, however, and stop its practice of lecturing and ultimatums.

-- If the North Vietnamese ever showed the vision that you have displayed in our relations, this conflict could be settled within a matter of weeks.

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-- In short, Mr. Prime Minister, we think international events in the past four months have deepened our mutual interest in the further development of our relationship. We think there is a mutual interest in giving that relationship more visible signs of progress. And we think that on all major issues our essential challenge is to key our actions to longer term realities.

-- President Nixon has no higher priority than the advancement of Sino-American relations. He has sent me here to move us ahead on the course which he charted with Chairman Mao and yourself in February.

-- Almost a year ago I came to this country and described it as a mysterious land. You interjected that it need not be so.

-- During this past year I have come to China four times, and I have dealt with Chinese leaders here and abroad on many occasions. The mystery has largely dissipated. In its place has come a genuine pleasure in visiting this country and talking to those who lead it.

-- It is my hope -- and belief -- that we can make significant accomplishments in our conversations over the next few days. Our talks last July and October served to reestablish contact after two decades of silence and to lay the groundwork for President Nixon's

-- The Presidential discussions with Chairman Mao and you

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marked a bold new departure in American-Chinese relations.

-- Our task now is to build on that beginning, to impart a gathering momentum to our relationship, and to help ensure that history will record that events of the past year were not episodes but rather the shaping of a new era.

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EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY*June 17,*
~~March 16, 19~~Checklist of Undertakings with the PRCSoviet Union

<u>Circumstance</u>	<u>Nature of Undertaking</u>	<u>Status</u>
Haig to Chou 1/3/72	US prepared to use resources, as during Indo-Pak crisis, to attempt to neutralize Soviet threats and <u>deter threats against PRC.</u>	White House to monitor
Haig to Chou 1/3/72; RN to Chou, 2/22/72	Prepared unilaterally to provide <u>certain information.</u>	HK gave to Chiao on 2.
HK to Yeh/Chiao 2/23/72	Will provide additional information if requested. <u>Will inform them if any drastic changes in information.</u> They are to name channel.	White House monitor. N tion necess unless/unti names chan requests in drastic chan occurs. <i>HK to give in</i>
HK to Yeh 2/24/72	HK will check <u>Mongolian</u> information.	CIA memo 2 confirms ac
RN to Chou 2/22/72	After Moscow summit, Dr. <u>Kissinger will report</u> personally to Chou on what was discussed and agreed to.	June trip ag: upon. Date be set.
RN to Chou 2/23/72	US will <u>oppose</u> any attempt by the Soviet Union to engage in any <u>aggressive action against China.</u>	White House monitor.
RN/HK to Chou 2/23/72	US will continue to keep PRC current on <u>SALT</u> developments.	Being done in HK channel.
HK to Chiao 2/23/72	US will keep PRC <u>meticulously informed</u> of all significant <u>negotiations</u> and <u>agreements</u> with the Soviet Union. We will inform PRC well in advance on significant negotiations so that if the PRC wishes	Being done th HK channel.

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<u>Circumstances</u>	<u>Nature of Undertaking</u>	<u>Status</u>
HK to Chiao 2/23/72	US will avoid <u>SALT</u> positions which might create pressure against the PRC. US discouraging French move on accidental war.	Being done through channel.
HK to Chiao 2/23/72	There will be no US pressure for the PRC to join the <u>Geneva Disarmament Conference</u> .	White House to monitor.
HK to Chiao 2/23/72	General US policy on <u>trade</u> is to place the PRC in the same legal status as the Soviet Union.	Actions taken in Feb. of previous House to
HK to Chiao 2/23/72	HK to provide PRC with complete account of <u>Middle East</u> discussions at Moscow summit as one of the topics to be covered.	White House monitor.
RN/HK to Chou 2/24/72 <i>We think Soviet figures are on the low side. In any event, hundreds of thousands of Jews wish to leave USSR.</i>	HK to check annual figures of <u>Jewish emigration</u> from the Soviet Union.	<i>official Soviet 10,000 to 20,000 we check and 21,000</i>
RN to Chou 2/25/72	Under no circumstances will the US at the <u>Moscow summit</u> negotiate about or discuss its relations with the PRC without the PRC's knowledge and approval. If the Russians raise the question of PRC intentions, the US will relay Chou's position that the PRC seeks improved relations with the Soviet Union, opposes hegemony, and does not seek collusion.	White House monitor. <i>did not PRC in</i>
RN to Chou 2/25/72	US policy is not to have the PRC and Soviet Union at odds; US wants good relations with both countries; US welcomes better relations between <u>Moscow and Peking</u> .	White House monitor.
HK to Huang Hua 3/14/72	<u>Third city for Soviet Union trip</u> will not be east of Urals.	"
"	<u>US is prepared to make any agreement with</u>	"

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Taiwan

<u>Circumstances</u>	<u>Nature of Undertaking</u>	<u>Status</u>
RN to Chou 2/22/72	There will be no US statements that the <u>status of Taiwan</u> is undetermined.	White H monitor
"	US will not support any <u>Taiwan indepen- dence movement.</u>	"
"	US, to the extent we are able, will use our influence to discourage <u>Japan</u> from moving into Taiwan as our presence diminishes.	"
"	US will support any <u>peaceful resolution</u> of the Taiwan issue that can be worked out and will not support any military attempt by the ROC to return to the mainland.	"
"	US seeks <u>normalization of relations</u> with the PRC and will work toward that goal.	"
"	The <u>two-thirds</u> of our <u>forces</u> on Taiwan which are related to Southeast Asia will be removed as the problem in Southeast Asia is resolved.	"
"	The reduction of the remaining <u>one-third</u> of our forces will go forward as progress is made on the peaceful resolution of the problem.	"
RN to Chou 2/24/72	As Vietnam is concluded one way or another, the two-thirds of <u>US forces</u> related to the war will be withdrawn. US will also move to reduce the remaining one-third as the US-PRC relationship develops.	"
"	Two-thirds of <u>US forces</u> will go hopefully as soon as we can finish Vietnam involvement and RN plan is also to reduce and withdraw other one-third during the period he has the power to act, i. e. , over the four additional years.	"

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<u>Circumstances</u>	<u>Nature of Undertaking</u>	<u>Status</u>
RN to Chou 2/24/72	US to move toward <u>normalization of relations</u> . No secret timetable can be fixed. If RN reelected he has five years to achieve his goal and will move toward it.	White Hc to monit
"	US will discourage <u>Japanese forces</u> from going into Taiwan after US forces leave.	"
"	No American personnel or agencies, directly or indirectly, will give any encouragement or support to the <u>Taiwan Independence Movement</u> , in the US or elsewhere. If the PRC gives us any information on this the US will act to stop US-related activity.	"

South Asia

RN to Chou 2/23/72 & 2/24/72	US will inform PRC in advance of recognizing <u>Bangladesh</u> .	HK told Hua 3/1. recognit planned week in <i>don</i>
HK to Huang Hua 3/14/72	White House has not informed bureaucracy about <u>Bangladesh</u> recognition and will entertain any PRC views on <u>timing</u> .	White H. keep pla secret f being.
RN to Chou 2/23/72	US will provide some <u>economic assist- ance</u> to <u>West Pakistan</u> .	White H to moni <i>long d</i>

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Korea

<u>Circumstances</u>	<u>Nature of Undertaking</u>	<u>Status</u>
RN to Chou 2/23/72	To the extent possible, the US will discourage <u>Japan</u> from any military intervention in Korea.	White H to monit
RN to Chou 2/24/72	The US will use its influence to discourage <u>Japanese intervention</u> in Korea.	" ↑ HK dis on Japan ↓

Japan

RN to Chou 2/23/72	US will restrain to the extent we can the Japanese from going from economic expansion to <u>military expansion</u> , but can only do so if we have close relations with them.	White H to monit
RN/HK to Chou 2/24/72	The US and the PRC should confidentially inform each other of <u>talks with Japan</u> .	" HK ready

Miscellaneous

RN to Chou 2/22/72	<u>Transcripts</u> of White House conversations with the Chinese will be seen only by RN, HK, General Haig, Holdridge and Lord. Bureaucracy will get an accounting of those matters which can be generally discussed and require bureaucratic implementation.	Transcr kept in House fi
RN to Chou 2/23/72	US will use influence to prevent <u>Japanese</u> or <u>Indian attacks</u> against China.	White H to monit
RN to Chou 2/23/72	If RN reelected, he will <u>keep HK</u> .	To be de in Nover
"	US ready to cooperate on <u>cancer research</u> and will make available all the resources	White H to monit

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<u>Circumstances</u>	<u>Nature of Undertaking</u>	<u>Status</u>
RN/HK to Chou 2/28/72	US will do nothing to embarrass the PRC by implication or otherwise about <u>sensitive subjects</u> discussed, such as the Soviet Union, India and Japan. The US will take every precaution to knock down stories that are inaccurate or in violation of understandings on privacy. The US will maintain discipline in the bureaucracy. The US will keep references to such subjects as Japan and India within the bounds of the Communique.	White H to monit
"	The US will check allegations that the US <u>bombed North Vietnam</u> during China trip.	US cond protecti tion only (Lavel)
HK to Huang Hua 3/14/72	The White House will support and monitor complete investigation of <u>poisoning inci- dent</u> in New York and will involve the FBI.	Bush, R feller, : Hoover White H monitor
HK to Huang Hua 3/14/72	HK will include Ambassador <u>Bush</u> in meetings only when UN matters are being discussed.	White H control.
HK to Huang Hua 3/14/72	Original <u>Scott/Mansfield</u> letter to be delivered through Watson, and trip details discussed in Paris.	Letter p to Paris Watson to handl
"	US will submit Albert letter for <u>Boggs/ Ford</u> about one week later-- letter will be pouched to Watson week of 3/20/72.	White H handling C
"	Most <u>visa problems</u> to be handled at nearest PRC embassy, i. e. usually Ottawa, with HK weighing in occasionally through Watson or HK channel.	State/W will be : by the C and Whi to moni

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<u>Circumstances</u>	<u>Nature of Understanding</u>	<u>Status</u>
HK to Huang Hua 3/14/72	US to raise PRC <u>table tennis</u> visit in Paris.	Instructi to Watso do
"	US will not increase <u>military operations</u> over North Vietnam unless there is a North Vietnamese offensive.	White Ho to monit do

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II. Developments Since the President's Visit

A. On the U. S. Side

-- Since the President's visit to the PRC the focus of U. S. diplomatic activity has been on Moscow; the negotiation of various bilateral agreements, most especially SALT; the visit of Ministers to both countries; HAK's secret April visit to Moscow; and the President's May visit, culminating in a spate of agreements, principles and communiques.

-- Despite this emphasis no damage has been done to the U. S. initiative toward China and indeed certain diplomatic contacts, exchanges and trade have taken place. (The escalated conflict in Indochina has been the only brake on US-China relations, and even on this the Chinese have been restrained to date.)

-- One main reason we have managed the triangle with Peking and Moscow well has been our meticulous briefing of the Chinese through our private channel. We have faithfully carried out our pledges to keep them fully informed, concluded no agreements with Moscow that could be directed against them, and offered to make any agreements with the PRC that we make with the USSR.

-- Through the spring we kept the Chinese briefed on the prospects for the Summit in Moscow. We forewarned them of HAK's April trip

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and debriefed them on it. We gave them a full rundown on May 16 about the Summit, outlining in documents and verbally all likely agreements. On June 3 we fully debriefed them on the President's trip, and one of the purposes of this June journey is to fill them in further.

-- Additionally, in our public statements, notably HAK press conferences, we have emphasized that we won't discuss either the PRC in Moscow or vice versa, that we have no intention of exacerbating the Sino-Soviet dispute, and have no competence in the issues between those two countries.

-- Finally with regard to North Vietnam's invasion, we have generally pointed the finger at Moscow (e.g. in the President's April and May speeches), emphasizing the massive supplies of Soviet arms. The Chinese have clearly noted this.

B. On the Chinese Side

-- Chinese preoccupation with the Soviet Union continues, as evidenced by their actions, diplomatic activity in the third world and Europe, and comments from observers in the PRC.

-- However, open polemics with Moscow have recently been on a relatively low level. The Chinese followed the President's Moscow Summit in virtual silence and have not allowed to become public their quarrel with the USSR over the use of Chinese ports for transshipment of Soviet goods to Vietnam.

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-- Essentially there has been no new direction in Sino-Soviet affairs. Their split remains fundamental and both are working to improve their relations with us, in part to counter each other. Moscow's reception of the President and Peking's reception of Kissinger, and their failure to give all out support to Hanoi show that both won't let the Indochina war get in the way of larger concerns.

-- Peking appears to have taken the US-USSR Summit in stride with the only private remarks reported being Chou's reference to the "half-way" nature of the SALT agreements.

-- Both countries have been carefully maneuvering vis-a-vis Hanoi with their relations with us in mind. In their contacts with us, each country has tried to saddle the other with responsibility for Hanoi's offensive.

-- The Chinese have rejected Soviet requests to offload in Chinese ports Soviet ships that were on the way to Haiphong. The PRC said its transshipment facilities were overloaded and suggested that Moscow sweep the mines. Peking has also resisted other Soviet requests, such as for expanded rail shipments. At the same time it has allowed some East European ships to enter Chinese ports.

-- The Sino-Soviet border talks have limped along with no progress. The annual Sino-Soviet trade agreement was concluded on June 13, indicating a willingness to permit some cooperation if no political concessions are involved. Trade is now about \$150 million per year.

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-- Though there is little Chinese talk of US-Soviet collusion any more, Peking is playing its role of leader of the smaller countries against the two big bullies in the United Nations. Thus, it criticized both our African policies in the Security Council session in Africa and it recently castigated us both at Stockholm for polluting the environment.

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THE SOVIET UNION

III. Talking Points

Introduction

-- In February the President reaffirmed to you three principles of our policy towards the Soviet Union. He assured you that:

- . We would keep you fully informed about our dealings with Moscow and take your views seriously into account.
- . We would not make any agreement that could be directed against the People's Republic of China.
- . We remained prepared to conclude with you any agreement we make with the USSR, if you were interested.

-- During the last four months we have meticulously adhered to these principles. Through Ambassador Huang in New York we have been keeping you completely abreast of developments in our relations with the Soviet Union. In our negotiations with the Soviets we have been careful to keep agreements free of any implications for third countries, including the PRC. And we have been consistently prepared to discuss with you any agreements that we have made with Moscow in which you are interested.

-- We shall continue to implement these approaches.

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Moscow Summit - General

-- This past spring, and most specifically on May 15, the President had me keep you fully informed about the prospects for his trip to the Soviet Union. And on June 5 we gave you an interim report on the discussions and agreements that were effected during the President's visit.

-- In brief, there were no major surprises in Moscow for us, and we believe therefore that there were no surprises for you. The conversations and their results proceeded almost exactly as we expected and as I outlined to Ambassador Huang on May 16.

-- The basic content and outcome of these negotiations were reflected in the bilateral agreements that were signed, the communique, the basic principles of relations between the U.S. and USSR, and some press conferences that I held copies of which were provided to you in Paris.

Bilateral Relations

-- There were essentially three types of agreements that we signed in Moscow.

-- First there were several agreements, such as those on space, the environment, science and technology, which reflect the fact that the U. S. and USSR are advanced industrialized countries and therefore share common problems and can contribute to each other's knowledge in solving these problems. These agreements came out exactly as outlined in the documents that I gave Ambassador Huang on May 16.

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-- The only agreement that was not finalized was the maritime one on which talks are continuing. We expect to iron out the remaining problem which has essentially to do with what percentage of goods should move on American ships, an issue that involves our labor unions.

-- Contrary to press speculations, the economic issues came out about as we expected. We established a joint commission to negotiate the details of various problems like trade, credits, lend-lease settlements, most favored nation treatment, etc.

-- We have gone over each of these areas, as well as well as others, to see if there is potential for making progress with you. We are willing to discuss any of them that interest you.

-- As I indicated in my opening statement, perhaps the most effective way for us to make progress on some of these issues, if you are interested, would be to establish joint bodies which could sort out various problems, set priorities and launch concrete programs.

-- The second category of agreement reached in Moscow was the SALT ABM Defense Treaty and Interim Offensive Agreement. As we informed you, we have made sure during the negotiations over the past couple of years, that any elements which might be construed as being directed toward third countries, such as the prevention of accidental war, have been kept out of the agreements. The documents we signed therefore have strictly to do with the U. S. and USSR in their role as the two major

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nuclear powers in the world.

-- The outcome puts a ceiling on major categories of weapons system. We froze those areas where the Soviet Union had dynamic ongoing programs and we had no plans for the next five years. We are satisfied that these agreements protect the national security of both sides. We recognize, as you yourself have commented, that these initial agreements still leave openings for further buildups in weapons systems. We and the Soviet Union plan to pursue negotiations in these areas, and we expect that they will resume early this fall. We have refused and will continue to refuse to discuss the implications of the buildup by other nuclear powers, especially the People's Republic of China. *We received an informal but very large letter request to consult about other nuclear countries*

-- We hope very much to conclude new agreements which will freeze other areas of the arms race and begin making some reductions. At the same time, we fully intend to maintain an adequate defense posture against the Soviet strategic threat.

-- I have briefed on this subject ad nauseum and would be glad to provide whatever length lecture you might like.

-- The third category of agreement was the document we signed concerning basic principles of relations between the U. S. and USSR. This is similar to the principles we agreed upon in the Shanghai Communiqué, although it is somewhat more extensive.

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-- The final document was almost exactly the same as the principles I outlined to Ambassador Huang on May 16. In drafting it we meticulously confined it to our bilateral relations with Moscow and kept out any lecturing or exhortations to third countries.

-- For example, the Soviet Union wanted to direct an appeal at all permanent members of the Security Council in the third principle, the prevention of conflicts or situation which would serve to increase international tension. We modified this language to make clear not only that our two countries do not have an exclusive responsibility in this area but also to shun instructions to third countries. *Remove Disarmament, budgetary and NPT.*

-- In addition we included language in various principles which was designed to serve as some restraint on Soviet policy. For example, the 11th principle stipulates that neither we nor the USSR make any special claims for ourselves or recognize the claims of anyone else to special rights or advantages. It specifically recognizes the sovereign equality of all states and states that the development of U.S.-Soviet relations is not directed against third countries. We believe these are useful principles. One reason we inserted them was to make clear that the Brezhnev Doctrine applied in Czechoslovakia is unacceptable.

-- We are not naive about the binding nature of these principles. The Soviet Union will pursue its national interests ~~as we will pursue ours.~~

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If Moscow were to violate the spirit of any of these principles, they would hardly be stopped by our waving the document at them. On the other hand, the principles do express an aspiration and a guidebook for future relations which could have a restraining effect on Soviet actions and which closely parallels the spirit of the Shanghai Communiqué. We think it is useful to have the Soviet Union sign such a document.

-- As we told you, the Soviet strategy was to line up as many of these bilateral agreements for signature in Moscow as possible to demonstrate that it is with them that one could do business. We pursued these agreements whenever they suited our own national interest and made sure that they would not harm third countries. Furthermore, we considered it useful for world peace generally to engage the Soviet Union in many of these areas. They create vested interests in various parts of the Soviet bureaucracy which can make themselves felt in a confrontation situation. The Soviet Union should be somewhat more hesitant to engage in conflict because of the prospect of losing some of the gains embodied in the various agreements.

-- Thus while we are not naive about Soviet intentions we believe the interlocking nature of these various bilateral agreements plus the restraint implied in the basic principles should serve to introduce some elements of moderation in Soviet behavior.

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-- As I said in my opening statement, we also believe that progress between the U. S. and the PRC in certain of these areas would be in our mutual interest.

-- We deleted from the Joint Communiqué, as well as from the Basic Principles, references proposed by the Soviets which would have suggested to other countries actions that they should take. Examples in the communiqué included a call for adherence to the Nonproliferation Treaty and for other countries to limit chemical weapons.

International Issues

*compensation /
tighten conduct*

The Joint Communiqué reflects the basic outcomes of discussions on international issues. As indicated, these centered on three areas: Europe, the Middle East, and Indochina.

-- On Europe, as we have indicated, the Soviet Union is following an energetic policy of promoting detente on its western flank. We are under no illusions about Soviet motivations in this regard. Relaxation of tension in Europe, and particularly the release of Soviet forces from the western flank, will enable Moscow to exert greater pressures upon the People's Republic of China.

-- However, we do not have the option of trying to increase pressures on the Soviets western front. We can not and will not do this. Our

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motivation, of course, is not to increase your difficulties, but we recognize that objectively that a detente in Europe could cause complications for the People's Republic. As I indicated in my opening statement, we believe that the best way to counter such pressures is to develop more concretely your own relations with ~~us~~ *each other*.

-- As you know, we agreed in Moscow to sign the Berlin Protocol on June 3 -- the U. S., USSR, France and Germany. In addition, the German treaties with the USSR and Poland have been ratified.

-- In light of these events, we agreed in Moscow to begin multi-lateral exploratory consultations looking toward a European Security Conference. These could start this fall, but the actual conference won't take place before next year.

-- We see certain pitfalls in such a conference, as it could give the illusions of complete detente in Europe. To date the Soviet Union has been very vague about the agenda for such a Conference. Our strategy is to prepare for it as carefully as possible so that we know what we are getting into. This also has the benefit of stringing out the preparations and delaying the actual convening of the Conference itself.

Committee technical group of P. Eisenhower want it.

-- We also secured Soviet agreement to begin exploratory talks on mutual and balanced force reductions in a separate forum in parallel with the Conference. ~~We have no great desire to reduce our forces in Europe.~~

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Our basic objective, however, is to make sure that to the extent that reductions do take place, that they are mutual and that the Soviet threat to our friends and ourselves is not increased as a result of them. On this subject too, we expect to make careful preparations so that we know fully the implications of what we are talking about.

-- With regard to the Middle East, we told you in February that I would be prepared to discuss this issue on this trip, in addition to our general practice of keeping you informed of any major progress.

-- Discussions on this issue essentially have gotten nowhere in recent months. We do not believe in territorial conquest, but we are firmly committed to the survival of Israel as an independent state. We are also concerned about the growing Soviet presence in the Middle East and the neighboring Mediterranean.

-- The Soviets have been pressing for a comprehensive settlement of the Middle East problem. Our view is that trying to negotiate a solution of all the issues at once effectively stymies progress on any of the issues. By insisting on a comprehensive solution, Moscow gives the Israelis too many pretexts to delay progress in any area.

-- Thus we believe it is much more realistic to try to achieve an interim settlement first, for example, on the reopening of the Suez Canal.

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This would get the negotiating process underway in earnest, would at least commit Israel to the principle of withdrawal, and would clearly not be considered a final settlement. In this way the log-jam could be broken.

-- In addition, although we believe that at some point the issues between Israel and all the Arab states must be settled, we think it is more realistic to begin where these are perhaps more soluble, for example, with Jordan or Egypt, rather than Syria which has not even accepted the UN Security Resolution.

-- In any event while there were extensive talks in Moscow, these consisted mostly of a repetition of known positions on both sides and no forward movement. Both sides did agree in the Communique to support the Jarring Mission and any other efforts for a just peace in the Middle East.

-- We will probably have further talks with the Soviet Union on this subject, and we will continue to keep you informed. We frankly don't expect early progress.

-- On Indochina, as the communique reflects, the two sides obviously had major disagreements. The Soviet Union supported North Vietnam and the PRG's negotiating positions. The President in turn explained the reasons for his actions in response to North Vietnam's invasion and outlined our minimal terms for a negotiated solution. You are familiar

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with our stand on these issues, and I am prepared to go into them in greater depth with you during my stay here.

-- You will recall that we offered to meet privately with the North Vietnamese on May 21 on the way to Moscow. We never received a reply to this offer. While in Moscow we did indicate that we could consider a return to the plenary sessions if the other side would agree to discuss our proposals as well as theirs. We believe that it makes more sense to have a private session first so that adequate instructions can be given to the negotiators at the public sessions in Paris. If the two sides are ever going to negotiate seriously this will have to happen first in private.

-- Thus we told the Soviet Union that we are not opposed in principle to a return to the plenaries, but we think the way should be paved first with a private meeting where both sides could talk frankly and review each other's positions. To this end we have sent a message to the North Vietnamese proposing a private meeting on June 28 preparatory to resuming the plenaries. We have not yet received a response.

-- Our view is that the fact of negotiations is not so important as the substance of the talks. It is always easy to have a meeting. The question is whether the meeting will make any progress or whether, as in the past, it will only raise false hopes which then create deeper disillusionment and tension.

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-- President Podgorny's visit to Hanoi may be for several reasons, but one of them will be to relay this general approach that the President outlined in Moscow.

China

-- As we have said publicly, and as we indicated to you on June 3, the subject of your relations with the Soviet Union never came up. The Soviets did not try to introduce this, and we would not have discussed it in any event.

South Asia

-- Interestingly, the Soviet Union had no desire to discuss the South Asian situation.

Iran

-- In this connection, as we indicated to you on June 3, the President had extensive talks with the Shah of Iran about finding means of arming Pakistan with regard to India. I am prepared to go into this matter in greater detail.

Poland

-- The President purposely wished to stop off in Poland after his trip to the Soviet Union to serve as a reminder that we do not consider Eastern Europe to be Moscow's exclusive province.

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-- We will do nothing to exacerbate relations between the Soviet Union and its Eastern friends. But we respect each nation's independence and will treat each of them equally and on the basis of their own foreign policy.

-- To this end we believe the stop in Poland was useful, as was the President's earlier visits to Romania in 1969 and Yugoslavia in 1970.

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JAPAN

I. February Talks

Prime Minister Chou's Position

-- Situation has changed since 1969 Joint Communiqué. Japanese now face question of four islands in north.

-- Japan is at the crossroads. Its economic development is abnormal. Its great rate depends inevitably on expansion abroad, and result will be military expansion.

-- Japan is now U. S. partner but when it reaches certain point it will no longer listen to our words. This will affect security of whole Pacific, because of their tradition of militarist thinking.

-- PRC hopes for new, independent, peaceful, democratic Japan which will have friendly attitude to both PRC and U. S.

-- State of war still exists between Japan and PRC.

-- Sato Government doesn't count, and PRC places its hopes on next Japanese Government.

-- If PRC and Japan restore diplomatic ties and conclude peace treaty, PRC will even consider non-aggression pact. PRC will not be the first to use nuclear arms. Pact would not exclude Japan from relations with other countries.

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-- Gromyko told Fukuda that the USSR might consider four islands in a peace treaty but would not return them while Sino-Soviet border talks were going on.

-- If either side learns anything about Japan it should inform the other.

The President's Position

-- U.S. ties with Japan are in China's security interest even though inconsistent with its philosophy. Alternative is either assertive Japanese defense policy, or movement toward USSR.

-- U.S. will use its influence to discourage Japanese intervention in Asia. But we would have no influence if we did not have security arrangement with Japan or U.S. presence in Asia.

-- U.S. tie with Japan can restrain Japan from following course feared by Prime Minister Chou: military expansion.

-- Japan's strength comes from its own vitality, not U.S. aid.

-- U.S. values its partnership and friendly relations with Japan.

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INDOCHINA

I. February Talks

Prime Minister Chou's Position

-- Indochina is key to relaxation of tensions in Far East.

-- Only the Indochinese people have right to negotiate with U. S.

But Indochinese area is of concern to China and China has obligation to give support and assistance.

-- If U. S. policy is to withdraw and accept area's nonalignment, U. S. should act more boldly. Otherwise, it only facilitates furthering of Soviet influence there.

-- As long as U. S. Vietnamization policy continues and they continue fighting, PRC can do nothing but support them. PRC will continue support for its friends even after U. S. leaves completely.

-- The PRC wants war to end, and the Soviet Union wants war to continue.

-- U. S. has cast aside many friends; we should choose our friends carefully. U. S. is in Vietnam by accident. Why not give this up?

-- The later we withdraw, the more serious the U. S. -Soviet contention will be, and another Middle East will develop.

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-- PRC will not get involved in Vietnam unless U.S. attacks it.

-- PRC supports the PRG seven points and two-point elaboration, and also the Joint Declaration of Summit Conference of Indochinese Peoples.

-- PRC supports Sihanouk because he is a patriot, even though his ideology is completely different and his views are independent.

-- North Vietnam used Cambodian territory only after U.S. brought about war. PRC knew about this only in 1969. So if war comes to an end and Sihanouk returns, Vietnamese forces will surely withdraw from Cambodia.

-- The U.S. would suffer no losses if it had not bombed North Vietnam just before Peking Summit. But now we have given USSR chance to say that music welcoming President to Peking is accompanying bombs exploding in North Vietnam.

The President's Position

-- U.S. withdrawal is a foregone conclusion and only a matter of months. Difficulty now is North Vietnam's insistence on imposing a

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political settlement. Withdrawal is inevitable but it must be done in the right way.

-- U.S. agrees with PRC that people should decide their own future. We have offered that. We have offered total withdrawal, with no "tail" behind.

-- Only USSR gains from continuation of war, because it wants U.S. tied down and wants greater influence in Hanoi.

-- Because so much depends on U.S., we cannot end war dishonorably.

-- We offer to settle military issues alone, or political settlement as we have suggested.

-- Total withdrawal will occur only with an agreement, and in exchange for return of POW's.

-- We will do what we have to do to defend our interests, protect our forces, and get back our POW's. If we cannot get negotiations, it is not we but North Vietnam who has forced us to continue military action.

-- U.S. had nothing to do with Sihanouk's ouster.

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II. Developments Since the President's Visit

Indochina: Vietnam

A. On the U. S. Side

Since the President's visit to China there has been a dramatic turn of events prompted by Hanoi's invasion of South Vietnam and continued intransigence at the conference table.

- The North Vietnamese preparations for heightened military activity against South Vietnam which we had noticed prior to the President's visit to Peking continued after his return. During March, there was a considerable step-up in these preparations. Nevertheless, we continued to exercise restraint, and attempted in a number of ways to bring Hanoi into genuine negotiations to end the Vietnam war. Our approach was centered on the comprehensive 8-point proposal for a negotiated peace which the President had presented in his speech of January 25.
- Hanoi's response to our peace offer was to reject it out of hand, and it was not until May 2 that Hanoi agreed to hold even a private meeting with us. (To assure a private meeting, we had accepted its insistence on holding a plenary session of the Paris talks on April 27.) This was despite the fact of a long and tedious exchange of messages, beginning on January 26, the day after the President's speech, when we sent word to

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- Meanwhile, on Easter weekend, Hanoi launched a conventional three division assault across the Demilitarized Zone accompanied by sophisticated armor, artillery and anti-aircraft equipment. This conventional invasion, in complete violation of the 1954 Geneva Accords and the 1968 bombing halt understandings, stripped away any pretense of a local insurgency and was conducted amidst cynical professions of peaceful intent by the other side. Madame Binh, in fact, had returned to Paris only several days earlier after a more than 5 month absence from the negotiating table.
- Against this background, you went to Moscow from April 20-24 to discuss the situation in Indochina and preparations for the forthcoming Summit. It was on the basis of these discussions that we agreed to a resumption of plenary sessions in Paris, which had been suspended in late March, provided we received a firm assurance that a private meeting would follow rapidly.
- As a result, there were two plenary sessions. There was also a private meeting between you and Special Advisor Le Duc Tho on May 2 at which we were confronted by the reading to us of the published PRG 2-point elaboration of February 2. There were no new elements in their negotiating position and, this meeting which had taken us 6 months to arrange, we simply

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-- Hanoi's negotiating intransigence and its mushrooming invasion confronted us with a new situation. There were only two issues left--first, would we stand by in the face of this invasion, allowing the lives of 60,000 U.S. troops to be jeopardized and leaving the South Vietnamese prey to this aggression. Second, in the face of Hanoi's negotiating intransigence, would we join with them to install a government of their choosing in South Vietnam. There were three choices: immediate withdrawal of U.S. forces, continued attempts at negotiation or decisive military action to end the war.

-- On May 8 the President announced his decision to take steps designed to deny Hanoi the weapons and supplies it needs to continue its aggression. He announced that all entrances to North Vietnamese ports would be mined and he directed that U.S. forces take appropriate measures within the internal and claimed territorial waters of North Vietnam to interdict the delivery of any supplies. Rail and all other communications will be cut off to the maximum extent possible.

-- At the same time, the President held out generous peace terms which deserve immediate acceptance by North Vietnam and would not require surrender or humiliation on the part of anybody.

The President said the actions he had announced would cease

when all U.S. prisoners are returned and an internationally

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supervised ceasefire throughout Indochina has begun. After that, the U.S. is prepared to stop all acts of force throughout Indochina and proceed with a complete withdrawal of all American forces from Vietnam within four months.

- The foregoing position was reaffirmed in extensive discussions with the Soviets during the Moscow Summit and is reflected in the Moscow communique.

B. On the Chinese Side

The Chinese position on Vietnam has been marked more by what they have not done, rather than what they have done.

- The Chinese have paid lip service to the DRV negotiating position but have left the impression they place more importance on ridding Indochina of U.S. military presence than on support for the DRV's political demands. But they have set no time limit for a U.S. withdrawal.
- The PRC supported Hanoi's May 10 statement denouncing the President's May 8 speech but the rhetoric was reserved. For example, they have avoided personal attacks on President Nixon. They have also not responded to Hanoi's call on "fraternal socialist states" to take "firm action" against us to halt our military measures against the DRV.

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- In more concrete terms, there is no indication that China has willingly reduced the flow of aid to the DRV. They provided \$75 million in military aid in 1971, an estimated \$37 million in ammunition and \$25 million in ground force equipment including trucks, tanks and some artillery. Estimated economic aid in 1971 was \$100 million. Some of the tanks used by the DRV in its invasion of the South came from China.
- The Chinese have not reintroduced combat engineer forces as they did in the 1965-68 period. Their presence in North Vietnam at that time brought them in direct confrontation with the U. S., an eventuality they now presumably wish to avoid.
- Thus far the Chinese are not allowing Soviet ships with cargo for the DRV into PRC ports. Two plausible reasons are offered: (a) they wish to avoid overburdening their port facilities and rail transport system and (b) they would perhaps like to force the Soviets into running the blockade adding to what they might think to be the prospects of a Soviet/U. S. confrontation.
- There has thus far been no discernible change in the pattern and extent of rail movements through China to the DRV border.

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(See Separate Paper for Complete Breakdown of This Issue)

-- Since we began our stepped-up air attacks against North Vietnam,

there have been a number of Chinese protests through the private channel over incidents directly involving China:

-- In mid-April, they protested a violation of Chinese air

space by U.S. aircraft which occurred during our attacks on Hanoi and Haiphong. They did not, however, protest the bombings of Hanoi and Haiphong per se.

-- On May 9 they protested damage which had been inflicted on two Chinese ships during U.S. air attacks on nearby North Vietnamese installations. (There was also a public protest in connection with this incident.)

-- On June 5 they protested another violation of Chinese air space by U.S. aircraft hitting targets near the North Vietnamese-Chinese border.

-- We have investigated each of these incidents and have found the circumstances as described by the Chinese correct. We have expressed our regrets and have told the Chinese that we will try to get our pilots to exercise greater care. It has become obvious in this situation that what is of concern to the Chinese is not the U.S. operations in North Vietnam but the fact that China or Chinese interests have been directly affected. The protests have been pro forma, however.

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On June 12, for the first time in more than a year, Peking publicly charged in a Foreign Ministry statement that its own security was threatened by intensified U.S. bombing in North Vietnam. The PRC characterized U.S. acts as "grave provocations against the Chinese people."

The statement probably reflects Peking's concern that U.S. activity may violate PRC airspace and risk a firefight with the Chinese. However, the statement did not commit the PRC to any course of action, did not mention any specific incidents and did not attach President Nixon by name.

Since the publication of the PRC protest a 25 mile buffer for U.S. bombing activities has been reestablished between the DRV-PRC border.

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Indochina: Laos and Cambodia

A. On the U. S. Side

- We continue to provide military and economic assistance and air support to Laos and Cambodia. We have no ground forces in either country.
- Long Tieng was successfully defended again this year despite a lightening thrust by the NVA across the PDJ in December in greater force than ever before. One NVA division remains in North Laos at about half strength; the other has been badly battered and has withdrawn to North Vietnam. U. S. air support in Laos has at times been heavy.
- Cambodia muddled through the dry season with no significant change in the balance of GKR/Communist control of the country. Indigenous Communist strength has nevertheless grown and FANK performance against these forces has been disappointing.
- There has been some political turbulence in Cambodia attributable to weaknesses in Lon Nol's leadership and possibly to some war weariness as well. But Lon Nol has just been elected President by a respectable mandate and this may help stabilize matters. Popular confidence in his leadership has clearly declined, however.

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B. On the Chinese Side

- The most significant point is the presence of close to 30,000 Chinese engineer, AAA and protecting infantry troops engaged in road construction in Northwest Laos. The road has virtually reached the Mekong and is aimed at developing LOC's from the PRC and DRV for use against Thailand. Construction may slacken off during the coming rainy season.
- Politically, the PRC maintains diplomatic relations with the RLG although it supports the negotiating demands of the Pathet Lao.
- The Chinese continue to support Sihanouk and provide him a residence in Peking. While sometimes using Sihanouk as a mouthpiece on Asian questions, at others they act as if he were a true embarrassment. Two significant examples were the recent visits of the President and Senators Scott and Mansfield. On both occasions the Chinese made a point of getting Sihanouk out of town to avoid any complications in relations with us.

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*In fact I like old ones better again p-5-6
6/17*

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VIETNAM

III. Talking Points

-- I would like to discuss Vietnam from two different perspectives:

- . First, as it relates to the emerging relationship between the U.S. and the PRC.
- . Secondly, the objective situation in Vietnam itself, in the military and political spheres and with respect to negotiations.

The Emerging US/PRC Relationship

-- We have no higher objective in our foreign policy than improving relations with the PRC. One of our most fundamental principles is the recognition of the PRC's importance in Asia and generally we have reflected this principle in concrete operative terms. And we have avoided taking any action which could even remotely be interpreted as pressure against your country.

-- To cite but a few examples:

- . We were ready to go to war in South Asia last December in part because of this very principle.
- . Our talks with the Japanese followed the line we said we would take in our previous discussions in Peking. We have deliberately refrained from words or actions which would encourage a Japanese regional security role or feed militarist sentiments in that country. Indeed we have attempted to discourage such trends.

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. In our bilateral dealings with the Soviet Union, including the agreements just signed in Moscow, we have adhered closely to the principle that progress in our relations with that country will not in any way be at the expense of our relations with you.

-- How does Vietnam fit into this picture? Vietnam is China's neighbor and the PRC's long range interests in the fate of that country are an unavoidable geopolitical fact.

-- For reasons of history, the United States has some limited remaining short-range interests in Vietnam which in no way impinge on the security of the PRC. They relate solely to ending our military involvement in that country in a way which will meet two objectives:

. First, the safe withdrawal of U.S. forces and the return of our prisoners.

. Second, the avoidance of any measure or agreement which could be construed as dealing dishonorably with a friendly government with whom we have worked so closely for close to two decades.

*Don't let us
with label of betraying friends - you may be the victim*
-- The problem for U.S.-PRC relations therefore is to reconcile our short-term objectives in Vietnam with China's long-term regional interests.

-- Our May 8 measures were designed solely to advance the modest U.S. objective of ending the conflict. They were not directed against any

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third country. I have explained elsewhere that we regret any incidents involving your territory or personnel, and the stringent measures we have taken to prevent reoccurrences.

-- Our actions will cease when our prisoners of war have been returned and there is an internationally supervised ceasefire throughout Indochina. When the ceasefire is implemented, we will stop all acts of force throughout Indochina and complete the withdrawal of all U.S. forces from South Vietnam within four months from that date.

-- We believe these terms are generous and deserve the serious attention of Hanoi. The terms would be honorable to all concerned and would leave the political issues to be resolved between the Indochinese parties themselves.

-- Now you say that it is for Hanoi and not yourselves to settle the war with us. We accept this position. We do not expect you to involve yourself in the details of any settlement or even the negotiating process.

-- But clearly you, no more than we, ^{can} contend that the situation in Vietnam does not affect China or U.S. /Chinese relations. Vietnam, and the course of our negotiations, is a fact in our bilateral relationship. How we both deal with that fact can affect our bilateral evolution.

-- We recognized in taking the steps we did on May 8 that they could have the practical consequence of increasing your influence in Hanoi. While this development may bring some short-term complications we do

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not see this being to our disadvantage in the longer run.

-- In our dealings with all other third countries, including Vietnam, we have spoken and acted in ways completely consistent with our recognition of your importance in Asia and our desire to avoid anything which might be construed as pressure against you. We look to your actions and words to take this factor into account in your own self-interest.

-- In this regard we have recently noted from Hanoi and elsewhere commentary concerning the American political scene as it relates to the situation in Vietnam. This compels comment on the nature of the President's domestic opposition and the consequences their victory would have on issues substantially more vital to the PRC than Vietnam.

-- The political opponents of the President may talk a more forthcoming game than President Nixon's administration. But the operative aspects of their foreign policy would be a much greater orientation toward Europe and a policy generally pro-Soviet, pro-India and pro-Japan. These are the traditional themes of their foreign policy. The objective consequences of their policies, in short, would be the isolation of China.

-- Furthermore, no matter what their policies, there is little doubt that the opposition would be incapable of acting decisively in critical situations. Their concerns may have a humanitarian flavor or other superficial appeal. But whatever the causes they espouse and the policies they advance could be reduced to irrelevancy by lack of resolve or dissipation

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Analyze situation in
offensive has failed
What can we
count on def
of fear then
playing
down

of the necessary U.S. strength to carry them out.

-- So we believe it is in your own interests that those in the United States who support the President's global policies not be discouraged by your actions or statements. You must decide whether it suits your real purposes to encourage those whose victory would have the objective consequences I have described above.

-- In any event I am sure you recognize -- as we do in your case -- that any attempt to interfere in domestic politics is totally unacceptable.

The Situation in Vietnam

-- Let me turn now to the specific situation in Vietnam. The Democratic Republic of Vietnam faces very difficult circumstances.

-- Militarily, the offensive in the South has bogged down. Large personnel and material losses have been sustained in return for very limited gains. In some areas, they are being pushed back.

-- Whatever course the fighting ultimately takes, in the short term it is not likely to be conclusive. The South Vietnamese army will not be defeated, and any attempt by Hanoi to sustain the fighting at the levels of the past three months will involve even greater losses for the North Vietnamese, given the nature of our response.

-- To the North, Hanoi's sources of supply have been placed in jeopardy by our May 8 measures. Seaborne imports have effectively been stopped. Overland routes, to the extent they can make up part of

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the deficit, are under constant interdiction. As a practical consequence, North Vietnam's capability to sustain large scale conventional warfare has already been sharply curtailed.

-- Politically in South Vietnam, Hanoi faces a government it cannot unseat by military means, yet with which it refuses to deal at the conference table.

-- Internationally, North Vietnam finds itself increasingly isolated diplomatically. [Its own socialist allies are confronted with difficult choices between their own national interests and past obligations of "fraternal socialism."] (Lord would delete this sentence.)

-- In the United States Hanoi possesses an ever-diminishing constituency. Our Vietnamization policy has succeeded in removing the Vietnam issue from center stage of American political life by sharply reducing conscription and casualties.

-- The President's critics on Vietnam are irreconcilable. There is no way to appease them. So they will be ignored.

-- The only conceivable hope Hanoi has in the United States is a McGovern victory. The North Vietnamese may believe that what they do will have a bearing on whether McGovern will win. This is wishful thinking. The opposition has all the votes it is going to get on the war issue. And the latest poll shows that McGovern is 20 percentage points behind Mr. Nixon. History has shown that this kind of gap cannot be overcome.

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-- I cite these facts not to take any pleasure that the conflict goes on. I cite them not to indicate that we are seeking a military "victory." I cite them only as objective reality which Hanoi and its friends must deal with.

-- We have not raised our terms for a settlement. On the contrary, the President's May 8 speech in some respects eased them. We are seeking a rapid solution to the war that is just for all parties. That was the objective of the President's May 8 decisions.

-- We have reached a point where all parties to the conflict, direct and indirect, should see that it is time for a peaceful settlement. Therefore, the time to negotiate an end to this conflict is this summer. Even assuming a McGovern victory in November, this U.S. administration would be in a position to carry out its present policies until January 20, that is seven months from now. But in the much more likely event that the President is reelected Hanoi will have to deal with him for four more years.

-- So Hanoi has a crucial choice to make. If one examines the American political realities, it is in its interest to negotiate now. It will find us a ~~generous~~ ^{very patient} interlocutor.

-- Against this background, what are the negotiating choices which we have suggested to Hanoi? Broadly speaking, we have offered two negotiating paths.

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-- First a purely military solution. This would entail our withdrawal from South Vietnam and an end to our military activities over all of Indochina in return for our prisoners of war and an Indochina-wide ceasefire.

-- This approach has the advantage of disengaging us from direct military involvement in Vietnam and leaving the political evolution in Indochina to the historical process. It avoids complicated and interminable U.S. involvement in internal political negotiations which can only delay a settlement *and later provide pretext for intervention*

-- Hanoi objects to this approach because for the moment their immediate political objectives in South Vietnam cannot be attained without our assistance.

-- Moreover, they are impatient, seeking to achieve all their objectives in one fell swoop. There is a lesson for Hanoi to draw from your vision and policies. Your country has seen the wisdom of allowing history to work its will. You are prepared gradually to move toward your objectives.

-- The second negotiating approach we hold out to Hanoi is one of a comprehensive settlement. In this framework, in addition to the military issues, we would agree on a set of political principles which would govern the political future of South Vietnam. Our only insistence is that these political principles leave the political process in the South genuinely open

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to all who might wish to participate. We cannot be asked to predetermine the outcome by overthrowing the present government as a precondition for such a comprehensive settlement.

-- This indeed is the central problem of our negotiations. Hanoi is asking us to work with them in attaining a political victory over our friends which Hanoi itself has been unable to attain by military means. This we refuse to do.

-- Short of conspiring with our adversary against our friend, however, we are prepared to be reasonable and flexible in negotiating along either of the two paths I have described above. Hanoi would do well to seize our offer promptly rather than prolonging the conflict by waiting for more favorable developments on the ground in Indochina or on the American political scene.

-- We believe that in this situation all stand to lose by continued conflict and all stand to gain by a rapid settlement:

. For Hanoi, a negotiated solution would fully protect its independence and the historical process would give the North Vietnamese a fair chance to achieve their goals.

. For the South Vietnamese people, it would at long last end the suffering and give them the opportunity to shape their future in peace.

. For the U.S. and the PRC, it would remove the one major

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obstacle to improvement of our relations. No more would
actions in a peripheral corner of Asia intrude upon our larger
bilateral concerns.

-- In sum, we do not ask you to sacrifice your principles or your
friends. We do not ask you to involve yourselves in the negotiating process.
All we ask is that you maintain the longer viewpoint about Indochina that
you do about other issues. And it would be helpful if, in addition, you
could impart this longer term vision to your friends in Hanoi.

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6/14III Talking Points

In my earlier opening statement, I gave the broad outlines of our course in Vietnam. I made three fundamental points:

-- Our course is set and we are taking the steps we have because Hanoi itself confronted us with no other choice.

-- Our measures are directed against no other country and in no way designed to threaten the security of the PRC.

-- Until now Hanoi has avoided entering into a meaningful dialogue with us although we stand ready to pursue serious discussions.

In regard to the first point, I have already explained why the President took the steps he did. He intends to persist in them until there is a decisive turn in the military situation or a breakthrough in the negotiations.

As far as the President's ability to persist is concerned, it would be a mistake on Hanoi's part to draw any analogies between the domestic political situation in the U.S. in 1968 and the situation which prevails today. If part of their calculation is to drag out the fighting until the results of the November election are known, this will prove to be a costly and serious error. They would be misjudging the American political scene and the President.

The President's opposition on Vietnam is irreconcilable. They provide no incentive for the President to change his course and the most vocal Presidential candidate who opposes our Vietnam policies, Senator McGovern,

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has probably received all the votes he is going to get. So it is futile for Hanoi to think in terms of scoring any successes by playing domestic American politics. It must think in terms of an American political reality which is likely to be very consistent over the next 4 years.

As for the second point, you have protested intrusions into your airspace and we have already acknowledged to you that any incidents which may have occurred were completely inadvertent and regrettable. We have instituted even more rigorous precautions than previously to prevent the recurrence of future incidents. *(See separate paper for full rundown)*

In our discussions today I think we should dwell most extensively on the third point -- Hanoi's attitude towards negotiations.

I would be less than frank if I did not say that our negotiating experience with the North Vietnamese has been one of great frustration and disappointment. Their tactics are those of pursuing extremes: making sweeping demands as preconditions on the one hand and rejecting our own negotiating proposals out of hand with sweeping generalizations on the other. They have made no effort to identify areas of common ground even though many of our proposals have been tailored specifically to meet their own points and they have declined to engage in a systematic negotiation with us in the sense that our two countries would understand the term. It is perhaps somewhat ironic that some of our frankest discussions concerning the Vietnam problem have been with Hanoi's

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allies rather than Hanoi itself, despite their insistence, which we appreciate, that the problem is one to be settled essentially in direct discussions with them.

But let me proceed directly to the heart of the problem in Indochina and that is the question of political power in Saigon:

-- We have already agreed with Hanoi on certain fundamental political principles.

-- We agree on the desirability of a neutral Indochina.

-- We agree on the need for the Indochinese parties to resolve their differences on the basis of mutual respect for independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and non-interference in each other's affairs.

-- We agree that reunification should be decided on the basis of mutual agreement between North and South Vietnam without constraint or annexation by either party and without foreign interference.

-- We agree there should be international guarantee for the fundamental national rights of the Indochinese peoples and the status of all countries in the region.

-- We agree that the political future of South Vietnam should be left for the South Vietnamese to decide for themselves free from outside interference.

It is on this last point -- South Vietnam's right of self-determination -- where we have important differences of view with respect to how this principle should be implemented. Throughout our negotiations we have held out to Hanoi the choice of two different approaches to bridging the gap between us on this issue.

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Our first -- and preferred -- approach has been to seek to separate the purely military from political issues. This was the essence of our May 31, 1971, proposal wherein we offered the withdrawal of our remaining forces in South Vietnam by a fixed date in return for our prisoners of war and an Indochina-wide cease-fire. This is essentially the approach of the President's May 8 speech wherein he proposed the cessation of all U.S. acts of force throughout Indochina upon the implementation of an Indochina-wide cease-fire and the return of our POW's and the subsequent withdrawal of all our forces in South Vietnam within 4 months from that time.

This avenue of negotiations -- which Hanoi attacks as leaving the political issues unresolved -- has a number of conceptual advantages.

-- It would bring a quick end to our direct military involvement in Indochina.

-- It would avoid arduous and interminable political discussions which could well have the effect of indefinitely prolonging the war.

-- As a corollary, it would leave the political process to be worked out between the Indochinese peoples themselves over a longer time span.

Hanoi objects to this approach for two reasons: first they see it as an effort on our part to perpetuate a hostile regime in the South for an indefinite period; second they want to attain all of their objectives in one fall swoop

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without leaving anything to the process of history. What they cannot seem to grasp is that by settling the military issues first and separately, a vital step would have been attained towards reducing our military involvement in the Peninsula. Their recent military actions have in fact had the precisely converse effect of provoking a temporarily increased military response on our part.

Our second approach has been to fold the political issues into one package along with military ones. Although not our preferred course, every negotiating counterproposal made by us last summer and fall dealt with political as well as military issues in deference to Hanoi's own insistence that settlement of these issues was inseparable. It was in this context that we reached agreement on the political principles I have enumerated above.

The stumbling block, as I have said, was the question of modalities for the attainment of South Vietnamese self-determination. In this connection we tabled a number of proposals, culminating in the President's speech of January 25, 1972, providing a way by which the problem of political power in Saigon could be resolved through negotiations. That proposal was concrete and detailed. We did not expect Hanoi to accept it immediately but we believed, and still do, that the offer was deserving of serious exploration and discussion with Hanoi--discussion which to date has not materialized.

Permit me to review some of the elements of our political proposal of

January 25 which we believe deserve the considered attention of Hanoi:

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-- There will be a free and democratic Presidential election in South Vietnam within 6 months of an agreement. This fact in itself acknowledges the prospect of political evolution and change which would flow from a comprehensive peace settlement.

-- The election would be organized and run by an independent body representing all political forces in South Vietnam which would assume its responsibilities on the date of the agreement. All political forces would be permitted to participate in the election and there would be international supervision.

Now let me make several points here as regards this independent electoral body. We would visualize it as having real powers to organize and run the elections. It would not simply be a thinly veiled mechanism to perpetuate the present government. Its composition would have to be worked out at the conference table but we would visualize the electoral commissions as having an essentially tri-partite character.

Another point which deserves mention in the question of assuring democratic liberties for all political forces during the electoral process. Hanoi has criticized our proposal professing the belief that PRG and other anti-government forces would not be guaranteed political freedom under our proposed arrangement. I can assure you that what we envisage is a political process under cease-fire conditions in which there is a complete ban on terrorism and reprisals and mechanisms to ensure that all South Vietnamese political forces have unrestrained access to the peaceful

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political process. It is unfair for either side to cite their current political practices--under war-time conditions when the contestants are shooting at each other--as evidence of their political behavior under peace-time conditions.

Finally, we must recognize in negotiating the composition and functions of this independent electoral body that in order to be effective it will in some respects have a quasi-governmental role. This will be inherent in its task of arranging elections, determining the qualifications of candidates and monitoring the voting process.

-- One month before the Presidential election takes place, the incumbent President and Vice President of South Vietnam will resign and the Chairman of the Senate will assume the role of caretaker head of government.

This is yet another important political fact and not accompanied by any provision that there be a corresponding change in PRG leadership. We are, moreover, not wedded to the 1 month period and if the time span between the resignation of the President and the holding of a new election were the only remaining sticking point in the way of a solution we would readily consider lengthening that time period.

These then are what we consider to be the more salient aspects of our political proposal. They contain elements of flexibility, they are a basis for negotiation not an ultimatum, and they merit serious thought.

In conclusion, let me say that the choice is now most squarely up to Hanoi. We have described in some detail the two broad negotiating paths which

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we believe are open to us. Hanoi's third alternative is to evade negotiations entirely in the hope of wearing us down or in expectation of domestic American political developments which might be to their benefit. We are certain that the negotiating track is the wisest course they could pursue at this time.